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In this timely and accessible book, Christina Bicchieri tries to capture the
essential features of social norms. This is a laudable initiative because social
scientists in different disciplines often apply different deﬁnitions. In light of
this Babel-like confusion, it is ironical that Bicchieri compares the function
of social norms within society to the role of grammar in a language.
Analogous to linguistic rules, Bicchieri deﬁnes social norms as behavioral
rules, which exist if a sufﬁciently large subset of individuals in a population
knows that in speciﬁc situations the behavioral rule exists and who conform
to this rule whenever they believe that
(a) a sufﬁciently large number of others conforms to the rule and;
(b) a sufﬁciently large number of others expects them to conform to the rule,
and may sanction behavior.
This deﬁnition enables a distinction between social norms like not smoking
in public areas on the one hand, and descriptive norms like trafﬁc rules on
the other; for descriptive norms, condition (a) applies, but (b) needs not to be
fulﬁlled. The dividing line is small: whether dress-down Friday is a descriptive
or a social norm critically depends on whether not adhering to the dress code
implies a punishment.
Several aspects of the deﬁnition deserve explanation. First, what consti-
tutes a “sufﬁcient number of others” may vary from person to person; Bic-
chieri suggests that individuals may for example put a lot of weight on the
behavior of celebrities. Although not further pursued, this idea is related to
the emerging literature on the role of “hubs”’ in social networks.
Chapter 2 provides an in depth discussion of a second aspect of the deﬁ-
nition: the role of expectations in the determination of behavior. Faced with
new situations we look for situational cues that subsequently activate a script
describing a stereotyped sequence of actions and social roles, including the
beliefs and preferences that support relevant norms in this new context. Social
norms are thus imbedded in scripts but Bicchieri stays silent on the origin of
the scripts themselves.
In chapters 3 and 4, Bicchieri claims that her norm-based utility function
explains some results from Ultimatum and Dictator experiments better than
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social preference models – notably the Fehr-Schmidt model – that provide
agents with a preference for fairness. In search for evidence that contextual
factors prime social norms, these chapters give a nice overview of the results
of social dilemma experiments executed by both economists and (social) psy-
chologists. One study shows that subjects are less likely to litter when they
observe other subjects either complying with the non-littering norm or – on
the contrary – when they observe them littering. Bicchieri argues that this is
because both actions make the non-littering norm salient. Other pieces of evi-
dence are less convincing. According to Bicchieri, changes in norm percep-
tion cause a decrease in rejection rates in Ultimatum experiments where the
proposer has alternatives less favorable to the responder. I however believe
that the Fehr-Schmidt model with context-dependent tastes for fairness might
explain this observation as well.
Chapter 4 discusses why communication between subjects dramatically
increases cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments. Does communica-
tion enhance group identity or does communication elicit social norms? Bic-
chieri prefers the social norm explanation and argues that group identity is
instrumental in focusing people on group norms, such as in-group loyalty and
trust. The evidence provided is however somewhat arbitrary; she cites a study
in which discussion between subjects increases perceived group identity with-
out raising cooperation rates but neglects other studies that do show a posi-
tive interaction between group identity and cooperation.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider the question how social norms emerge. Build-
ing on well-known work by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch on infor-
mational cascades, Bicchieri shows in chapter 5 how norms can emerge in a
population of trendsetters and norm-sensitive conformists. Chapter 6 provides
an illustration in the form of a simulation study. In the presented model,
agents believe that a norm exists but have no idea what the norm is. The
model’s purpose is to show how a norm of fair division can arise endoge-
nously. In all, I do not ﬁnd the set-up convincing because agents’ estimates
of the social norm seem to be biased towards a norm of fair division (e.g.
if they expect to social norm to be x or y, both with probability 1/2, their
expectation is simply determined as (x+ y)/2). Moreover, because the sensi-
tivity to the perceived social norm is part of the utility function, in the end
the model is not about the emergence of norms but about the emergence
of a norm of fair division, conditional on agents being sensitive to social
norms.
As Bicchieri readily admits, what still needs to explained is how norm-
based preferences emerge. This is an interesting topic for a next book, which
could also discuss the representation of social norms in memory in connec-
tion to the nascent ﬁeld of neuroeconomics.
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